Maltz and Targonski (2002) have provided an important service by disaggregating the county level data to help researchers examine measurement errors in the county level data, but their conclusion "that county-level crime data, as they are currently constituted, should not be used, especially in policy studies" is not justified. All data has measurement error, presumably even their measures of this error. Unfortunately, however, Maltz and Targonski provide no systematic test for how bad the data is. Their graphs obscure both the small number of counties affected, that these are rural counties, and that just because some of the population in a county is not represented in calculating the crime rate, that is not the same thing as showing that the reported number is in error. Nor do they provide evidence for the more important issue of whether there is a systematic bias in the data. The evidence provided here indicates right-to-carry laws continue to produce substantial reductions in violent crime rates when states with the greatest measurement error are excluded. In fact, the restricting the sample results in somewhat larger reductions in murders and robberies, but smaller reductions in aggravated assaults. 
I. Introduction
Virtually all data have measurement error.
1 Such problems usually bias results against finding relationships, but the issue is not simply whether measurement error exists but whether it is systematic. The paper by Maltz and Targonski (2002) concentrates on the county data obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports and notes that not all police jurisdictions in a county report their crime data. Despite somewhat better imputation methods used for state level data, some of the measurement problems apparent in the county level data will also be present in the state level data if only because the state level data is created using these missing individual police departments. The particular measurement problems focused on by Maltz and Targonski are not present in the city level data, and it is important to note that the city, county and state level UCR data all produce similar results with respect to right-to-carry laws, waiting periods, onegun-a-month rules, safe storage laws, and other gun control laws. 2 This paper will focus on the impact that these data problems have on right-to-carry laws because that is the thrust of the Maltz and Targonski paper. 
II. A Note on the Graphs
As Maltz and Targonski state in section five of their paper, "small counties are more likely to have extensive reporting deficiencies than larger counties." But the figures they use tend to mask 1 See Klepper and Leamer (1984) and Leamer (1978) for detailed discussions of measurement error in data. An interesting recent discussion of measurement error in crime data can be found in Miron (2001) . 2 While Maltz and Targonski criticize the work of David Mustard and one of the current authors, John Lott, Mustard and Lott were familiar with the problem raised by Maltz and Targonski. Indeed, they brought these problems to Michael Maltz's attention. But Maltz and Targonski have done an important service by actually obtaining the data to help us see whether these problems are large or small. Lott and Mustard did not have the data available to do more than crudely try to account for this problem despite literally hundreds of hours on the telelphone with the FBI and the ICPSR. When David Mustard approached Michael Maltz to see if he knew of any data errors that we had missed we had already compiled an eight page single-spaced list of problems. It is also part of the reason why Lott used city, county, and state level data in doing his research on crime (Lott, 2000) . An extensive debate has arisen over the county level version of the data (see e.g., Black and Nagin, 1998; Lott, 2001; Moody, 2001; Plassmann and Tideman, 2001) . 3 For a survey of the debate over concealed handgun laws see Lott (2000 and . The original paper that Maltz and Targonski focus on it by Lott and Mustard (1997). or hide this important fact and they apparently fail to realize that the gun control work they're criticizing uses regressions weighted by population.
Their Figure 5 examines the 159 counties of Georgia and purports to show how wide spread under-reporting is. 4 The figure dramatically draws attention to the counties with a high level of under-reporting. For example, there are 377 county/years in the figure with under-reporting over 30% (18.2% of the total 2,067 county/years). However, the figure tends to obscure the 1,474
counties/years with under-reporting less than 10% (71.3% of the total). Even more important, however, the figure does not account for the fact that most of the counties with high rates of under-reporting have very small populations (and thus received very little weight in the gun control work cited since all the estimates were weighted least squares). In fact, the 377 county/years with over 30% under-reporting only account for 6.3% of the total population covered in the 2,067 county/years. In contrast, the 1,474 county/years with less than 10% The proper way to deal with the disparity in size (and, thus, importance in estimation) of counties is to weight the analysis by population size. This concentrates the effort on high population counties without totally eliminating the information that may be contained in low population observations. Failing to weight by population is the primary reason why Maltz and Targonski's Figure 6 appears to be so dramatic. To understand the problem with not weighting by population, begin with the Georgia example. From above, the smallest counties in Georgia averaged 37% under-reporting. Over those same 13 years, the 10 Georgia counties with populations over 100,000 in 1992 (which constituted 46.7% of Georgia's population) averaged 2.0% under-reporting. If the average Georgia under-reporting rate were computed as a simple average across all 159 counties, those small counties with high under-reporting rates are given equal weight as Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, and the other 100,000+ counties with virtually no underreporting. The correct way to construct an average Georgia under-reporting rate is to weight each 6 county by their population. Figure 2 illustrates the Georgia average under-reporting rate computed with and without population weights. The fraction of county/years with 30% or greater under-reporting is illustrated with solid bars while the fraction of the total possible population in these counties is illustrated with empty bars. While our analysis reveals six states with over 40% of their county/years under-reporting at 30% or greater and four states with between 30% and 40% of their county/years at that level, only in Mississippi do these under-reporting counties include more than 30% of the total state population. Over all with 48 states included, only 6.8% of the total possible population came from counties with 30% under-reporting or greater. 5 We had some trouble recreating the Maltz and Targonski A final point should be made. Just because a portion of a county's population is going unrepresented in calculating the county's crime rate is not the same thing as implying that an error is occurring. A county's rate will be the same whether 70 percent or 100 percent of the jurisdictions in the county are reporting if the missing jurisdictions are similar to those that are reporting. In the more rural counties where crime is relatively unlikely it is quite likely that in most years the murder rate will be zero whether 70 or 100 percent of the counties are reporting.
III. Systematic Biases
Take a simple example of measurement error. Academics use survey data all the time. Yet, few would probably be surprised to find that 5 percent of those being surveyed were not paying close attention to the questions that they answered. 6 Even if 10 percent of those surveyed randomly answered 50 percent of the questions that they were given, being told that 5 percent of all the questions were answered randomly would not seem like a particularly high number, but that is the order of magnitude of error that is implied in the county level data shown by Maltz and Targonski.
Even in Maltz and Targonski's careful paper there are errors even in their evaluation of the data.
For example, Figure 6 is a mishmash of incorrect labels showing when different right-to-carry concealed handgun laws have been adopted. They list states such as Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Arizona, Nevada, Texas, South Carolina, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Wyoming as having their laws prior to 1977, when in fact all their laws were adopted after 1992.
What is more important than the existence of measurement error is whether it is systematically biased. For example, Maltz and Targonski note that there are fewer police departments that are failing to report their crime data over time. If the rate of increased reporting over time is greater for the non-right-to-carry states and if those newly reporting police departments had a higher crime rate than already reporting departments, the bias would work to exaggerate the benefits of right-to-carry laws. Alternatively, if increased reporting over time is greater for right-to-carry states and those newly reporting police departments had a higher crime rate than already reporting departments, an reported benefits of reduced crime from right-to-carry laws would be an underestimate.
According to the Maltz and Targonski reporting data, however, under-reporting was getting worse from 1980 to 1992. More importantly, it was getting worse at a faster rate for the "restrictive" states than it was for the states changing from being "restrictive" to "permissive" between 1977 and 1992. 7 Our Figure 4 illustrates the under-reporting rates for the three categories of states (restrictive, change, and permissive) from 1980 to 1992. Over the thirteen years covered, the average under-reporting rate for the states that didn't change their law was 7.0% while the under-reporting of the change states was 5.1%. More importantly, Maltz and
Targonski did not notice how the under-reporting rate for the states with permissive laws over the entire period increased from 13% in 1980 to 27.5% in 1992, the rate for states with restrictions over the entire period rose from 3.8% to 8.5%, while under-reporting in the change states only rose from 4.0% to 5.9%. If Maltz and Targonski are correct that under-reporting biases down measured county crime rates, the much faster rise in under-reporting rates for states that do not change their laws will lower the measured crime rate in states that are not changing their laws relatively to those that adopt right-to-carry laws --biasing the results against the hypothesis that concealed carry laws reduce violent crime.
6 Most academics would probably be shocked if the percent of students in their classes who did not pay attention was as low as 10 or 20 percent. Fortunately, the measurement error regarding crime rates is on the left hand side of any of the regressions examining crime rates, where it is not normally viewed as that much of a concern and does not require more sophisticated techniques to bound the maximum likelihood estimates. The estimates repeat the nonlinear before-and-after trends that were first reported in my paper with Mustard and then in both editions of my book. We use Maltz and Targonski's Table 6 to exclude the 21 states that they list with at least 10 percent of their county observations missing at least 30 percent of the county populations. Yet, even excluding all these states generally produces results that are very similar to those reported previously. The one difference from previous results involves rape where crimes decline at a fairly constant rate both before-and-after the adoption of the right-to-carry laws and the law seems to have produced no real impact on crime. Finally, Table 1 analyzes the effect of excluding the states with the greatest measurement error using the more simplistic and sometimes misleading before-and-after averages and before-and- The results in our Table 1 imply consistently larger drops in murder and robbery rates than using the full sample. With the before-and-after averages, dropping out those states whose county crime rates are measured with the most error implies larger drops in murder, rape, and robbery rates and either comparable or smaller drops in aggravated assaults. Compared to the full sample, the impact of right-to-carry laws on reducing murders is 26 to 85 percent larger, on rapes 66 to 75 percent larger, and on robbery 150 to 290 percent larger, but the impact either remains the same or falls by 66 percent for aggravated assaults. 9 With respect to the before-and-after trends, only the impacts on murder and robbery are statistically significant and extremely large, implying up to an additional 6.4 percent drop in murder rates for each additional year that the law is in effect. Reducing the sample size further with stricter and stricter criteria for measurement error actually produces larger and larger reductions in murder. 10 The results for rape should provide a cautionary example of how misleading before-and-after averages can be. While the before-andafter averages show a large drop, once one examines the results shown earlier in Figure 5C it is clear that the decline was occurring for this set of states long before the adoption of the law.
Conclusion
Maltz and Targonski have provided an important service by disaggregating the county level data to help researchers examine measurement errors in the county level data, but their conclusion "that county-level crime data, as they are currently constituted, should not be used, especially in policy studies" is not justified. All data has measurement error, presumably even their measures of this error. Unfortunately, however, Maltz and Targonski provide no systematic test for how bad the data is. Their graphs obscure both the small number of counties affected, that these are rural counties, and that just because some of the population in a county is not represented in calculating the crime rate, that is not the same thing as showing that the reported number is in error. Nor do they provide evidence for the more important issue of whether there is a systematic bias in the data. The evidence provided here indicates right-to-carry laws continue to produce substantial reductions in violent crime rates when states with the greatest measurement 9 The results for rape are no longer always statistically significant compared to past work because these estimates report robust standard errors. 10 These results also show why using simple before-and-after averages can be problematic. The before-and-after averages for rape show a large significant in rapes, but Figure 5C makes it obvious that this is because rapes are falling continuously over the entire period and not because there was any change that occurred for the set of states examined here when the laws went into effect.
error are excluded. In fact, the restricting the sample results in somewhat larger reductions in murders and robberies, but smaller reductions in aggravated assaults.
There are trade-offs with all different types of crime data. State level data has some of the same measurement problems found with county data and in addition has severe aggregation problems (Lott, 2000) . City level data may avoid the measurement problems discussed by Maltz and Targonski, but it doesn't cover large areas of the country. County level data shares the differing problems to differing degrees. There are measurement error issues, but county data do not face the aggregation problems of state data and do not miss the large portions of the country missed by city level data. Previous research on guns and crime by Lott has used all these different types of UCR data and more (such as the Supplement Homicide Report and data on multiple victim public shootings collected from Nexis searches) precisely to test whether the results were sensitive to the type of data used. The consistent results indicated that there was not a systematic problem with the county data. The regressions account for year and state fixed effects; county population; per capita income; per capita welfare payment; per capita unemployment insurance; average income support payments to those over 65 years of age; the thirty-six different demographic categories by age, sex, and race; different gun control laws (safe storage, right-tocarry, one-gun-a-month rules, waiting period, penalties for using guns in the commission of crimes); and the state unemployment and poverty rates.
